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JEFFREY S. LUBBERSt
INTRODUCTION

When the editors of the Duke Law Journal invited me to
Durham to discuss the National Performance Review's regulatory
reform recommendations, they mentioned that Vice President
Gore had quite naturally been their first choice. So I'm both honored and a bit apprehensive to be here in his place. There is
something we both have in common, however: a reputation for
being a stiff speaker. His, of course, is undeserved, as those of
you who saw him dismantle Ross Perot ifi the NAFTA debate or
banter with David Letterman can attest. I especially liked when
Letterman asked him how he would like to be addressed: Mr.
Vice President? Mr. Gore? Al? He responded that "Your Adequacy" would be just fine.' So that is what I am trying to live up
to today.

t Research Director, Administrative Conference of the United States; J.D., University of Chicago; B.A., Cornell University. The author served as team leader for the National Performance Review's Improving Regulatory Systems team. Other members of the
team were Don Arbuckle, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Neil Eisner, Department of Transportation (DOT), Lone Schmidt, Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), Kathy Ting, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and Magnolia Samadani
(White House Intern). The views expressed in this Address, except where indicated, are
solely those of the author. This Address was presented at a symposium on the National
Performance Review at the Duke University School of Law on January 20, 1994.
1. Late Show with David Letterman (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 8, 1993), available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File.
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The Vice President's National Performance Review (NPR,
with apologies to National Public Radio) involved a large-scale,
serious, intensive scrutiny of the federal government's operations.2
Although several previous administrations have undertaken studies
of executive branch operations,3 the NPR was different in the
breadth of its scope and in that it was executed primarily by career civil servants.
The formal work of NPR lasted for six months. On March 3,
1993, about 200 employees on loan from agencies throughout the
federal government assembled to begin work on the project. These
workers were organized into a series of agency-specific and governmental systems teams In addition, the President asked his
cabinet to create internal "reinvention teams" to work parallel to
NPR, and to create "reinvention laboratories" to begin experimenting with new ways of doing business.' Finally, the Vice
President personally held "town meetings" at each cabinet department, heard from tens of thousands of citizens, and led national
conferences on reinventing government in Tennessee and Philadelphia.6
The highly readable report, From Red Tape to ResultsCreating a Government that Works Better & Costs Less, not only
was published on time but also became a best seller at the
2.

See AL GORE, THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, CREATING A GOVERN-

MENT THAT WORKS BETTER & COSTS LESS (1993) [hereinafter NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW].
3. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S PRIVATE SECTOR SURVEY ON COST CONTROL: A REPORT

TO THE PRESIDENT (1984) ("Grace Commission Report"); PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION, A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: REPORT ON
SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES (1971) ("Ash Council Report"); SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMIN. PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDI-

CIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENTELECT (Comm. Print 1960) ("Landis Report"); COMM'N ON ORG. OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH OF GOV'T, Legal Services and Procedures (1955) (second "Hoover Commission
Report"); COMM'N ON ORG. OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOV'T, The Indepen-

dent Regulatory Commissions: A Report to the Congress (1949) (first "Hoover Commission
Report"); ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE. ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941);
PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMIN. MGMT. IN THE FED. GOV'T, REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE WITH STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOV-

ERNMENT (1937) ("Brownlow Committee Report").
4. NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 2, at i. For a listing of the agency-specific teams and their recommendations, see id. app. A at 133. For the governmental

systems teams and their recommendations, see id. app. C at 159.
5. Id. at i.
6. Id. at i-ii.
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Government Printing Office, on the Internet, and in two private
paperback editions. It describes about 100 of the most significant
actiohs and recommendations of the task force, listing several
hundred more in appendices.' Most of the members of NPR returned to their home agencies after the report's publication,
although a small residual staff of about fifty continues under the
NPR aegis to seek implementation of the report's recommendations.
I.

THE IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS TEAM

One of the eleven "governmental systems teams" created
under the NPR was the Improving Regulatory Systems team.
When I was recruited as the team leader, I noticed that the team
name was a bit more modest than those of some of the other
teams, which sported ambitious gerunds such as "transforming,"
"reinventing," "rethinking," "redesigning," and "reengineering."
Whether this cue was intended or not, it turned out to be consistent with one of our team's basic conclusions, that relieving the
burden the regulatory process imposes on both the regulated and
the regulators8 lies in improving the current system, rather than in
radically restructuring it.9
Other than the name of the team (which we shortened to the
"reg systems" team to avoid being called the "IRS" team), the
only limit to our mandate was the instruction not to duplicate the
efforts of a White House task force. The task force was
concurrently developing an executive order on centralized review
of agency regulations for the new administration to replace similar
orders enforced by the Reagan and Bush administrations. 10 The
White House task force was headed by the Vice President's
Counsel and Chief of Staff, Jack Quinn, and later cochaired by
Sally Katzen, the new Administrator of the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management and

7. Id. at ii.
8. See OFFICE

OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, ACCOMPANYING REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEv: IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS 11-13 [hereinafter IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS].

9. See id. at 3 (stating that "[tihe President, agencies, and Congress need to take a
series of steps to improve the process to accomplish regulatory goals in a cost-effective
manner") (emphasis added).
10. See id. at 11, 77-78.
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Budget (OMB). It also included representatives of other key
advisors in the executive office of the President.
Our team concentrated on the regulatory process within the
agencies, while the Quinn-Katzen task force -focused on presidential (OMB) review. As we embarked on interviews with regulators
and regulated interests, we quickly found that the first item on
their agenda invariably was "OMB review of rules." Fortunately,
this one limitation on our scope of review precluded discussions of
this politically charged issue, enabling us to develop consensus
recommendations more easily. At the same time, however, it became clear that our team and the Quinn-Katzen task force each
needed to know what the other was doing, so I was invited to
participate in the task force meetings. As a result, the executive
order issued on September 30 included some of our team's
ideas," and the September 7 NPR Report published the outline
12
of the order with approval.
The scheduling demands necessitated by the September deadline made it difficult to conduct new empirical research. We therefore embarked on a review of past studies (including, of course,
those done by the Administrative Conference 3 ) and a series of
interviews with business groups, public interest lawyers, and agency and congressional staffs about the perceived problems with
agency regulatory activities. We also began making (and discussing) lists of problems and potential solutions.
In June, our team's effort received a major boost with the
release of a major, three-year study by a panel of the Carnegie
Commission on Science, Technology, and Government headed by
former Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator
Douglas Costle. The panel was an exceptionally distinguished
group that included Judges Stephen Breyer and Patricia Wald,
Professors Donald Elliott and Richard Merrill, and former Dupont
Company Chairman Irving Shapiro. The study, Risk and the Envi-

11. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993).
12. See IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 8, at 77-78.
13. The Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) was established in
1964 by the Administrative Conference Act, Pub. L. No. 88-499, 78 Stat. 615 (1964)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 591-596 (West Supp. 1994)). It is an independent
agency in the executive branch and serves as the government's permanent, in-house adviser on the fairness, efficiency, and effectiveness of administrative procedure. Its recommendations are listed at 1 C.F.R. § 305 (1993) (providing a cumulative list of the
Conference's recommendations).
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ronment: Improving Regulatory Decision Making,14 was quite
thoughtful and consistent with our findings, and we drew heavily
from it.
Our team concluded that many complaints about the substance of regulations are exacerbated by perceived problems with
the regulatory process.' 5 Regardless of their general views about
regulation or deregulation, most interviewees agreed with our
conclusions.
*
*
*
*
*
•
*
*
*

Regulation is too often uncoordinated and duplicative.
Regulators and Congress should be more selective and sophisticated in the choice of regulatory approaches.
Better and earlier opportunities to participate in the rulemaking process would be valuable.
Agency clearance procedures should be streamlined for less
significant rules.
Negotiated rulemaking, although not a panacea, is a technique worth promoting.
Risk prioritization imposes needed discipline on regulatory
agencies.
Agencies need to find better ways to import good science
into regulatory decisionmaking.
Agency heads and regulators need more training in the
process and substance of regulation.
Agency regulators and congressional personnel need to talk
to each other more frequently and effectively. 6

The consensus that began to crystallize around these points
led us to believe that we could recommend procedural reforms
that were neither pro-regulation nor anti-regulation but would
produce better regulation. Moreover, it reinforced our belief that
the existing regulatory foundation, as prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act, is basically sound and that major statutory
17
or structural reform is not necessary.

14. See CARNEGIE COMM'N ON SCIENCE, TECH., AND GOV'T, RISK AND THE ENVIRONMENr. IMPROVING REGULATORY DECISION MAKING (1993) [hereinafter CARNEGIE
COMM'N].
15. See IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 8, at 11.

16. Id. at 17-73 (proposing individual responses to each of these conclusions).
17. The report stresses the point that the APA's rulemaking process is "simple and
straightforward." Id. at 8, 41.
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Our review resulted in ten recommendations that were approved by the Vice President for inclusion in the NPR Report."8
The next Part discusses the recommendations, noting any actions
that have been taken to implement them.
II. THE

RECOMMENDATIONS 19

REGO: Create an Interagency Regulatory Coordinating Group
This recommendation, in a sense, sets the table for the others.
In urging the creation of a forum for the agencies to discuss overlapping policy and procedural issues, we hearkened back to President Carter's U.S. Regulatory Council, headed by Douglas Costle,
which improved coordination in several areas and showed much
promise in its two-year lifespan before it was disbanded after the
1980 election.
We concluded that, if anything, the need for coordination had
increased in the intervening years.2" We were pleased that President Clinton agreed with us, ordering the establishment of an
interagency Regulatory Working Group (RWG) to be chaired by
the OIRA Administrator.2 The RWG has already had several
meetings, and it has created task forces on risk assessment, use of
cost-benefit analysis, streamlining agency rulemaking, and using information technology in rulemaking. I am optimistic that the creation of the RWG will help effect the implementation of the following nine recommendations.
REG02: Encourage More Innovative Approaches to Regulation
As the report emphasizes, one of the biggest challenges regulators face is choosing the best tool to solve a problem. In many
instances, a nonregulatory solution may be the best one. Examples
include efforts to spur technological innovation (such as EPA's
"Golden Carrot" program to encourage development of an environmentally friendly refrigerator2), information disclosure, and

18. See NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 2, app. C at 167-68.
19. The following discussion uses the NPR numbering system for recommendations,
e.g. REGO1, used both in the appendix to the main report, see supra note 2, and in
Improving Regulatory Systems.
20. IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 8. at 18-19.
21.
22.

See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,739 (1993).
IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 8, at 23.
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consumer education. When a regulatory approach is necessary, alternative, market-oriented approaches are sometimes preferable.
We urged that representatives at high levels of government encourage agencies to consider such approaches.4 3 President Clinton
has responded by directing agencies to do so.
To promote alternative regulatory approaches, we also urged
the development of a Deskbook on Regulatory Design for regulators and legislators. The Deskbook would describe alternative
regulatory approaches, analyze their strengths and weaknesses, and
suggest when to use them and how to combine them. The RWG
could sponsor and oversee the development of the Deskbook.
REG03: Encourage Consensus-Based Rulemaking
As the readership of this Journal is well aware.' the traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking process has tended too
often to encourage adversarial, uncooperative behavior by people
who might be adversely affected by a proposed rule. This posture
more often than not leads to protracted litigation, especially in
controversial areas of regulation such as environmental or workplace safety rules.26
To counter this trend, my home agency, the Administrative
Conference of the United States (ACUS), developed a consensusbased approach called negotiated rulemaking (sometimes called
regulatory negotiation, or reg neg).27 This technique relies on a
convener who holds open negotiating sessions with representatives
of affected interests and of the relevant agency to produce a consensus-based proposal. Such a proposal still undergoes the usual
comment process, but by then, the areas of controversy should be
limited, the comments few, and lawsuits rare. 8 Since 1982, there
have been about thirty-five reg negs undertaken by about a dozen
agencies,29 and most of them have produced consensus or near-

23. Id. at 26.
24. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735-36 (1993).
25. See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking
Process, 42 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992).
26. IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 8, at 29.
27. Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations, Recommendations No. 82-4, 85-5, 1 C.F.R.
§§ 305.82-4, .82-5 (1993).
28. IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 8, at 29.
29. Id. at 29-30.
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consensus proposals while dramatically reducing the rate of litigation over those rules.30
The report details the benefits and limitations of this approach
and urges the President to direct agencies to consider advocating
reg neg. Again, President Clinton has responded quickly, generally
advocating reg neg' and specifically requiring agencies either to
select at least one pending or proposed rulemaking as a candidate
for reg neg or to explain why it is not feasible to do so. 3 ' Al-

ready, OIRA and ACUS have held a well-attended symposium on
reg neg to help agencies follow the presidential directive.
REGO4: Enhance Public Awareness and Participation
One refrain that we heard repeatedly was that agencies need
to do more to secure early public awareness of rulemaking and
not simply rely on the Federal Register.33 Negotiated rulemaking
is one way to do so, but agencies have used less formal mechanisms as well, such as policy discussion groups, public meetings,
and focus groups, to obtain input before issuing notices of proposed rulemakings or to help determine how existing rules are
working. Agencies also should consider whether an ombudsman, as
used by' the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), and Comptroller of the Currency, or a
toll-free hotline might increase public participation during the
implementation of rules.34
This area is one in which the use of new information technologies has great potential for improving public interaction with
agencies. The computerization of rulemaking dockets, electronic
bulletin boards, and even e-mail reg negs are ideas that may soon
be realized.

30. See id. at 32 n.7.
31. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,740 (1993).
32. Negotiated Rulemaking, Memorandum for Executive Departments and Selected
Agencies [and the] Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. 58
Fed. Reg. 52,391 (1993) (alteration in original).
33.

IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 8, at 37-39.

34. Id. at 36-38.
35. Soon after this program, the Department of Labor announced plans to try an
electronic reg neg. See Cindy Skrzycki. Modem Times: OSHA to Try Writing Rules in
Cyberspace, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1994, at DI.
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REG05: Streamline Agency Rulemaking Procedures
Our team found that many agencies had great difficulty describing their own internal clearance processes. One agency hired a
contractor to produce an eighteen-foot flow chart with 373 boxes
to describe its rulemaking process.3 6 Long delays in some
rulemakings suggest the old bureaucratic joke: "What's the difference between 'under consideration' and 'under active consideration?"' "'Under consideration' means 'we've lost the file,' and
'under active consideration' means 'we're trying to find it."'
We encouraged the RWG to help agencies develop ways to
tier their internal review processes so that less controversial rules
face fewer procedural hurdles. This selective approach mirrors that
taken by the executive order for OIRA's review of agency
rules.37
We also discovered a new idea-new, at least, outside the
EPA: "direct final" rulemaking. Under this procedure, used by
the EPA to issue rules that it expects to be uncontroversial, the
Agency publishes a notice in the Federal Register saying that the
rule will become effective in sixty days unless someone submits
notice within thirty days of an intent to file a negative comment.39 For about 90% of these "direct final" rules, EPA officials
have correctly predicted that there would be no negative comments, thereby cutting the internal review time by more than half
for such rules.4" Recently, a large agency in the Department of
Agriculture announced plans to use this procedure.4 President
Clinton has issued a directive requiring agencies to examine their
internal rulemaking clearance processes and report in six months
on the steps taken to improve them.4'

36. IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 8, at 41.
37. Only rules deemed to be "significant regulatory actions" are subject to OIRA review. Exec. Order No. 12,866. 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735. 51,740-41 (1993).
38.

IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 8, at 42-43.

39. Id.
40. Id. at 43 & n.11.
41.

See Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA, Policy Statement on

Use of Direct Final Rulemaking, 58 Fed. Reg. 47,206 (1993).
42. See Memorandum on Agency Rulemaking, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1933

(Sept. 30, 1993).
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Encourage Alternative Dispute Resolution When Enforcing Regulations

It is our hope that the term "alternative dispute resolution"
will soon be a misnomer as various techniques, such as mediation,
arbitration, minitrial, and early neutral evaluation, become part of
agencies' everyday menu for resolving disputes. The acronym
ADR may be preserved by substituting "appropriate" for "alternative."
The movement toward the use of ADR by federal agencies
has accelerated with the passage of the 1990 Administrative Dispute Resolution Act,4 3 which removed some hurdles from agency
use of ADR. Unfortunately, despite some clear success stories in
agencies such as the EPA, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Farmers Home Administration, Health and Human Services,
and the Department of Labor (DOL), some agencies have given
ADR limited emphasis." Our recommendation was to ask the
President to encourage ADR strongly, especially in the area of
budgetary and personnel incentives, and to make it easier for the
government to hire mediators, arbitrators, and other "neutrals., 45
We were especially pleased that the NPR Report specifically
pledges support for the expanded use of both ADR and reg
neg. 46 The Administrative Conference is continuing its active role
in promoting these recommendations. NPR selected ACUS to develop an exciting pilot project that would use e-mail to connect
agency ADR programs and would place an extensive library of
resources concerning ADR on-line. Electronic ADR cannot be far
behind.
REGO7:

Rank Risks and Engage in Anticipatory Regulatory
Planning

Improved long-range strategic planning was one of the themes
of NPR, leading in part to the Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993, which authorizes agencies to create pilot
projects based on performance-based strategic planning initiatives.47 Our specific recommendation that regulatory agencies en43.
44.

5 U.S.C. §§ 571-583 (Supp. IV 1992).
IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 8, at 48-49.

45. Id. at 49-50.
46. NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 2, at 118-19.
47. Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat.

1994]

BETTER REGULATIONS

1175

gage in systematic risk prioritization grew out of the EPA's success
with this approach. In 1987, the Agency asked seventy-five senior
career managers to compare and rank the relative risks posed by
thirty-one environmental problems the Agency regulates.48 This
effort pointed out not only disparities between the rankings and
the legislatively mandated resource allocation at EPA, but also the
variance between the public's and the "experts"' perceptions of
risks.49 In 1990, EPA's Science Advisory Board made further recommendations to the Administrator on how to undertake risk
prioritization."
We joined the Carnegie Commission in applauding this effort
as a "groundbreaking enterprise 51 and urged the other twenty or
so agencies that regulate health, safety, or environmental risks to
follow.5 2

The need to anticipate future regulatory problems is related to
risk prioritization. EPA is a leader in this area as well. It has
' to anticipate problems such
established a special "futures staff"53
as one it failed to anticipate-the problem of mercury disposal
caused by the increased use of cool fluorescent lamps. 4 Had the
problem been anticipated earlier, the lamps could have been made
without mercury. The futures staff has already identified a similar
problem with lithium in the batteries of electric cars.55 We suggested that regulatory agencies be encouraged to develop processes
and devote specific resources to ranking risks and anticipating future regulatory problems. 6 The purpose behind this recommendation was well stated by one of the "Peter Principles:" "If you

290 (1993) (to be codified in scattered sections of 5, 11, 31 U.S.C.).
48. IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 8, at 53-54 (citing ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (1987)).

ASSESSMENT OF

49. Id. at 54.
50. Id. (citing ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REDUCING RISKS: SETTING
PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1990)).

51. CARNEGIE COMM'N, supra note 14, at 81.
52. IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 8, at 55-56.
53. Id. at 54.
54. Interview with David Rejeski, Futures Staff Chief, Office of Strategic Planning
and Environmental Data, Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation, EPA, in Washington,
D.C., (June 24, 1993).
55. IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS. supra note 8,at 55.
56. Id. at 55-56.
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don't know where you are going, you will probably end up somewhere else.""7
REGO8: Improve Regulatory Science
Carl Sagan has identified a growing problem in society:
We've arranged a civilization in which most crucial elements-transportation, communications, and all other industries;
agriculture, medicine, education, entertainment and protecting the
environment; and even the key democratic institution of voting-profoundly depend on science and technology. We have also
arranged things so that almost no one understands science and
technology. We might get away with it for a while, but eventually
this combustible mixture of ignorance and power is going to blow
up in our faces.5 8
This warning applies to most regulatory agencies as well because
most regulatory decisions are made by an agency head who is not
a scientist and who must rely on the advice of program officials,
administrative law judges, and agency general counsels-who are
all much more likely to be lawyers than scientists. "When [such]
decisions are challenged in court, they are reviewed by judges,
who rarely have scientific training. This process is understandably
regarded as deficient among scientists who follow the regulatory
process."

9

Scientific advisory boards are a partial solution to this problem. EPA has a large-scale, well-funded board that advises the
Administrator on scientific and technical aspects of environmental
problems.: FDA has recently followed suit with a twelve-member
board. 1
We joined the Carnegie Commission in urging agencies to
improve their scientific capabilities. 2 We advocated that regulatory agencies that depend heavily on scientific information create an
advisory board or explain why one is not needed.63 President
Clinton has taken this advice, creating (within the White House)

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

(1969).
Carl Sagan, With Science on Our Side, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1994, at Xl.
IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 8. at 59; see id. at 59 n.8.
See id. at 60.
Id. at 60-61.
Id. at 61.

63.

Id.

57.

LAURENCE F. PETER & RAYMOND HULL, THE PETER PRINCIPLE 159
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the National Science and Technology Council64 as well as the
President's Committee of Advisors on Science
and Technology,
65
scientists.
outside
fifteen
of
up
made
is
which
REG09: Improve Agency-Congress Relationships
Most of what federal agencies do is traceable to their legislative mandates, and it is not unusual for regulators to complain that
their hands are tied by overly restrictive, excessively detailed,
poorly conceived, or inexpertly drafted legislation.6 Wherever the
blame may lie, there is little doubt that communication between
agencies and their congressional counterparts has broken down.
The problem has perhaps been exacerbated by divided political
control of the branches in recent years. Congress has not trusted
the agencies, and the agencies have not been completely
forthcoming in the legislative drafting process. More frequent interbranch forums was one solution our team-favored.
More specifically, we discovered that agencies generally do not
provide drafting assistance to legislative staffs.67 We recommended that a process be developed by which a designated senior agency official could advise chairpersons and ranking members of congressional committees as long as appropriate disclaimers concerning the administration's position (or lack thereof) on pending legislation were respected.'
REGIO: Provide Better Training and Incentives for Regulators
We began the discussion of our final recommendation with
the truism that "[a] regulatory system is only as good as the people implementing it. ' 69 Recommendations for improved training
are hardly original, but we were genuinely struck by the lack of
training for presidential appointees, especially given the intensive
orientation members of Congress and the federal judiciary receive.
A recent study by the National Academy of Public Administration
reported that 79% of presidential appointees received no orientation whatsoever. 0 We are encouraged that the RWG has acknowl64.
65.
66.

Exec. Order No. 12,881, 58 Fed. Reg. 62,491 (1993).
Exec. Order No. 12,882, 58 Fed. Reg. 62,493 (1993).
IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 8, at 65.

67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

66-67.
67-68.
69.
70 (citing Robert S. Adler et al., Shaping Up Federal Agencies: A Basic
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edged this problem and is exploring ways to address it with the
Administrative Conference.
At lower levels, there is currently a good, ongoing training
program for federal lawyers, the Legal Education Institute in the
Department of Justice.7 Unfortunately, legislation passed several
years ago required the program to move from Washington to
Columbia, South Carolina, where it is unlikely to attract as many
students and pro bono faculty. 72
Finally, we were inspired by an idea of Judge Stephen Breyer,
who suggested that regulatory professionals be cultivated within
the government and encouraged to rotate among the branches as
in the French Conseil d'Etat.73 Our slightly less grand plan would
be to establish at least an "honors" rotation for select, mid-level
career staffers among agencies with key regulatory mandates, like
OIRA. 4 OIRA Administrator Sally Katzen has announced plans
to begin such a program.75
III.

CONCLUSION

In a nutshell, these ideas were our team's recommendations
and we are pleased that some of them are already coming to
fruition. Other NPR teams also proposed changes in regulatory
processes. Some proposals, like the increased use of ADR and reg
neg at the DOL, were consistent with our recommendations;76
others, such as allowing judicial review of agency actions under the
Regulatory Flexibility Act,7 expanding the use of waivers from
federal regulations,7' and requiring a shift to self-inspection of

Training Program for Regulators, 6 J.L. & Pol. 343, 364 n.90 (1990), quoting NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, LEADERSHIP IN JEOPARDY: THE FRAYING OF
THE PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS SYSTEM 20 (1985)).

71.
72.
73.

IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, supra note 8, at 70.
See id. at 70 & nn.11-12 (citation omitted).
See id. at 71 (citing STEPHEN G. BREYER, THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EF-

FECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993)).

74. Id. at 72.
75. Letter from Sally Katzen to author (and other members of Regulatory Working
Group) describing "OIRA's Regulatory Exchange Program" and soliciting participation

(Jan. 11, 1994).
76.

See

NATIONAL

PERFORMANCE
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worksites under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 9 were
not affirmatively advocated by our team.
I suspect there will be critics who claim that we set our sights
too low, ignoring proposals for more radical reforms, such as a
regulatory budget, sunset laws, specialized administrative courts, or
various new impact statement requirements. Our answer is that we
were convinced of the merits and the low costs and risks of our
ten recommendations and we did not think that more radical approaches were necessary or feasible. In other words, to quote an
aphorism I once heard attributed to Jeremy Bentham, "Don't talk
to me of reform; things are bad enough as they are!"

79.

Id. app. A at 146 (Recommendation DOLlO).

